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INTRODUCTION
Psychotherapy has grown vigorously and
rapidly over its first century of existence.  It has
become like a rather overgrown piece of land,
where all sorts of vegetation and animal life
mingle and where it is quite easy to lose one’s
way as in a jungle, even as one is looking for
clarity and direction. It is not surprising that
some zealous spirits have spent the past decades
trying to organize and sanitize this complex and
confusing environment, by introducing some form
of regulation into it. Professional bodies have sprung
up in almost every country of Europe in response
to a desperate need for clarification and accountability,
aiming to discipline the professionals working in
the field. The therapeutic field itself however has
remained fairly untouched by this process of
formalization and standardization of psychotherapy
training and practice.  
We are still unclear as to who are the rightful
owners of the professions of psychotherapy and
counselling as the sister professions of psychology
and psychiatry vie with psychotherapists for control
over the field. As psychotherapy is becoming
established it needs to define itself more clearly
in relation to other professions and functions in
society. In order to do so it needs to clarify its
objectives in overall socio-cultural terms. It needs
to become far more lucid. Instead of remaining
engrossed in petty battles between different methods
we need to set clear priorities and objectives and
examine how we can most usefully make a
contribution to society. 
DEFINING PSYCHOTHERAPY
This sends us back to our roots: we have to re-
examine where we come from and what the
therapeutic mission is about in the first place. We
have to ask ourselves afresh what it is that psycho-
therapy is actually supposed to do for people. The
answer to this question is not as self evident as
we might think. 
In spite of the establishment of the European
Psychotherapy, by the EAP, a lot of diversity remains
across Europe in relation to how the profession
of psychotherapy is defined. When professional
bodies meet they still have considerable differences
of opinion about what psychotherapy consists of
and which different modalities can be accepted.
This is because psychotherapists do not all hold
the same beliefs and do not all have the same
objectives. As soon as one tries to reach an agreed
definition there is immediately disagreement about
whether psychotherapy is to be seen as a form of
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treatment or as a form of personal development.
There is still no agreement about whether psycho-
therapy is primarily a medical, a psychological,
an educational or a spiritual activity.
There can be no doubt that psychotherapy is
about helping people with personal, emotional
and relational problems through the intermediary
of the therapeutic relationship. But even then,
people will disagree about the definition of helping
or whether this should involve mostly emotional,
behavioural or cognitive elements, and whether
it should be based on an intra- or inter-personal
model. 
Some think that psychotherapy has a didactic
impact others think it should absolutely not have
one. There are therefore fundamental philosophical
differences in a way rarely found within one
profession. Psychotherapy for some is about priesthood,
for some about parenting, for some about education,
for some about healing, for some about friendship,
for some about mental or moral exercise. In some
ways psychotherapy can encompass the whole of
human activities and, like philosophy once upon
a time it makes claims to being able to understand
everything and everybody. We should be aware
of our own grandiosity and put some limits to it,
by defining the overall objectives. 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION OF
PSYCHOTHERAPY
All psychotherapists intervene in people’s
lives and either explicitly or implicitly affect the
way in which they think and feel about themselves,
others, the world and human living in general. In
the process of psychotherapy moments of reflection
and contemplation may occur when the person’s
life is seen in a new light. The light thrown is the
light of the therapist’s belief system, as taught by
this particular modality of psychotherapy and
interpreted through the therapist’s personal
experience and wisdom accumulated over a life
time of personal and professional experience.
Every therapy sooner or later deals with radical
philosophical questions. Sometimes this is done
explicitly when clients raise direct moral and personal
dilemmas, but it is always done indirectly whenever
clients struggle with questions of understanding
self and other, right and wrong, purpose and meaning.
The roots of psychotherapy are in fact deeply
embedded in philosophy: at least of that branch
of philosophy that concerns itself with ethics and
in particular with how to live a good human life.
Those who take on this profession end up debating
the big issues of life and the universe, often without
any systematic training in the field of philosophy.
Approaches to psychotherapy represent distinct
value systems and belief systems although they
remain non-explicit about their own philosophical
and spiritual guidance role. The calibre of a lot
of the thinking is therefore low. There is a risk
that psychotherapists end up making interpretations
from a background of unassimilated home-spun,
popular philosophy. 
UNDUE INFLUENCE
There was a time when many psychiatrists practised
psychotherapy without specific training, ending
up doling out medication together with words of
moral advice. 
Nowadays, even in psychiatry, much attention
is paid to psychotherapy training. However such
training very rarely directly addresses the moral
and metaphysical questions that our clients struggle
with. How often do we debate on our training courses
whether there is life after death or what the parameters
of a good relationship are? How accustomed are
we with the investigation of the consequences of
people’s actions or in-action? Where do we place
ourselves as therapists when clients wonder
whether to kill themselves or whether they are
entitled to take somebody else’s life? How do we
know whether to support, admonish or contradict?
How clear are we on fundamental questions of
freedom and necessity, of good and bad and right
and wrong?
Much of the time psychotherapists deny the
need to intervene in the philosophical dilemmas
of their clients and they stick to the resolution of
clients’ conflicts or internal turmoil. In spite of
this almost all our interventions are value laden
and suggestive of a particular point of view and
so we do give philosophical, political and social
guidance whether we like and admit it or not.
Charles Rycroft once reported to me that one of
his patients at the end of his therapy with him
had remarked how easy it had been to work out
what his therapist’s political beliefs were. Rycroft
had believed himself to be neutral and he had
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consistently abstained from bringing any of his
own values and beliefs into the therapy. His
patient however had noted that Rycroft used to
make an interpretation whenever his patient
spoke about the conservatives whilst he would
listen silently when he spoke about the labour
party. He had drawn his conclusions accordingly.  
This raises the important question about what
clients and patients are actually picking up from
their therapists, silently and non explicitly but
probably very effectively. What do clients learn
from their therapy that remains unsaid? What new
tricks and values do they pick up with the interventions
their therapists make or abstain from making?
The issue of influence and indoctrination has to
be seriously considered. As long as psychotherapists
deny that they are actually influencing the essential
ways in which their clients see and experience
the world, it remains difficult to systematically
investigate how such influence is exerted, let alone
to ask how we might do so in a constructive way.
It also raises the question of how we can carefully
and fairly research the effect of our work on our
clients. 
Such research is difficult enough as it is, because
we do not have clarity on what kind of influence
is beneficial and desirable. Erwin in his book
Philosophy and Psychotherapy (Erwin, 1997) points
out that it is not for instance clear whether we
should evaluate psychotherapy by the therapist’s
or the client’s standards. Should we consider psycho-
therapy a success if an unemployed person ends
up establishing him or herself as an independent
copy-editor using the ability to work as the criterion
of success, when perhaps the tendency towards
self-isolation which was the problem in the first
place, has thus been compounded?
ETHICAL QUESTIONS
Woven in with the personal and psychological
problems that our clients bring are other deeper
layers of difficulty which are to do with the perennial
questions about the meaning of life and the moral
issues about how a good human life should be
lived. There are some fundamental philosophical
issues that are regularly dealt with in psychotherapy.
They include basic questions such as what is the
correct way to raise children or run a society?
They include existential questions such as why is
there something rather than nothing, why am I
me and not someone else, what is the meaning of
life, is there such a thing as a self and is there such
a thing as altruism? There are ethical questions
about how my actions make a difference in the
world. More profoundly there are metaphysical
issues such as what happens after my death, is a
foetus a human being and is there such a thing as
extra-sensory perception or the presence of ghosts?
Perhaps most importantly there is the problem of
good and evil. Children are intensely preoccupied
with the existence of goodies and baddies from
an early age as they try to figure out what kind of
person they should be themselves. People wonder
whether goodness will always win, is always the
best option or whether sometimes the strong
have to be mean and goodness equals weakness.
People really want to know whether they must
fight evil, or whether they are evil themselves
for thinking and doing certain reprehensible
things. They are often perturbed because they
have or have not done something specific in their
lives. Guilt is a source of much human suffering.
Should we treat these conditions medically or
psychologically or should we go beyond psycho-
therapy and tackle them at the root? Is psychotherapy
enough to help people return to their essential
grasp of human nature, the human condition
and the life they want to try and live, or do we
need a much more practical form of philosophical
enquiry and praxis? Have we gone beyond psycho-
therapy back into the field of applied philosophy?
It is quite noteworthy that psychotherapists
should increasingly be treated by society as the
wise people who can show the direction in which
culture should move. It is psychotherapists and
counsellors who speak on radio and television
about a myriad of issues on which they form
opinions based on their clinical experience. It
would seem important that they reflect upon such
issues from a rather more solid foundation in
philosophical thinking and argument. Recently I
was asked to comment for a BBC programme on
‘what women want’ and I was somewhat relieved
to find that I had a previous commitment as I
would have been hard put to do justice to such a
thorny issue in ten minutes. If I speak from my
own, complex and sometimes confusing experience
how do I know that what I say is said because I
am a woman rather than a human being or middle
aged? How can I know that what is true for me,
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for my clients, for my students, is true for other
women too? How can I be sure that the things
we want superficially are also the things that we
want deep down. Or indeed how can I know
whether what I desire is worthwhile or just an
illusion. As Oscar Wilde once pointed out: there
are two tragedies in life, one is to not get what
you want and the other is to get it. 
Asking such questions about desire and
longing sends us back to ancient times, three
thousand years ago, when people were also doing
philosophy, i.e. searching for wisdom and when
they were acutely aware that doing philosophy
was about seeking better ways to live. What we
now call psychotherapy was originally called
philosophy and we would be very wrong to
believe that the history of psychotherapy starts
merely a century ago. 
AN ANCIENT ENQUIRY
I would like to refer you, in the context of this
questioning of the function and role of psychotherapy
to a book by Martha Nussbaum, called The Therapy
of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics
(Nussbaum, 1994). It is a book that reminds us
of our origins and in doing so it also implies and
sketches out a different future.
This is a very significant book for psychothe-
rapists. It provides the long awaited scholarly
overview of the origins of western psychotherapy
as it was first conceived in its Hellenistic antecedents. 
Here is a complete account of the initial psycho-
therapeutic function of philosophy, showing us
how much our cultural progress has jeopardised
and lost track of over the centuries. Applied philosophy
was always meant to have the very practical function
that psychotherapy and counselling are attempting
to hold in the twentieth century. As Nussbaum
puts it: 
‘Aristotle and others knew that where the
body had a need for medicine, the soul also
had a need for an art that would heal diseases
of thought, judgement and desire’ (ibid.,
p. 40).
Philosophy was meant to have a practical application
in the form of an art of moral education and good
living. Those who are familiar with Socrates’
teachings and Plato’s philosophy will already be
well aware of this (Vlastos, 1992). We are usually
less aware of what became of philosophy during
the subsequent centuries, both in Greece and Rome.
It is fascinating to consider the contributions of
Aristotle and his followers, Epicurus and the
Epicureans, the Skeptics and the Stoics. When
we pay attention to our forebears we find that
there is much of therapeutic value in each of these
philosophies. Each rethinks essential and existential
principles in its own way. Hellenistic philosophy
was quite blunt about its objectives, which were
definitely to achieve eudaimonia, the good or
flourishing life. The definition of what such a life
consists of and how it is achieved varies from
one philosophical school to another. Paying attention
to these matters predictably means that one has
to ask a number of searching political questions.
Think for instance about the Aristotelian emphasis
on the good life as something that can only be
taught to the privileged intellectual, although it
should be attainable by the many, in contrast with
the Epicurean ideals, which are a much less sophis-
ticated product that can be more easily absorbed
by the crowd, but that has the drawback of being
dogmatic as a consequence. Equally in many of
the Hellenistic philosophies, but particularly in
the Aristotelian the condition of an individual’s
pursuit of the flourishing life, is that it should
benefit the community at large rather than only
the individual.  
Guidelines for Aristotelian practice are remarkably
compatible with existential psychotherapy (van
Deurzen, 1988, 1997). Note for example the pres-
cription that the philosophy teacher’s (psycho-
therapist’s) discourse with the pupil (client) should
be a co-operative, critical one that insists on the
virtues of orderliness, deliberateness and clarity.
Teacher and pupil are both active and independent,
though the teacher is able to offer experienced
guidance. The ethical inquiry that they engage in
together is seen as a ‘winnowing and sifting of
people’s opinions’ (Nussbaum, 1994, p. 76). Pupils
are taught to separate true beliefs from false beliefs
and to modify and transform their passions
accordingly. The idea that emotion can be educated,
rather than ignored, or merely expressed or suppressed,
is still revolutionary today, two and a half thousand
years later. Aristotle’s descriptions of the various
emotions and what can be done with them is not
unlike that of Spinoza, who also showed them to
be like a field of opposing forces (Spinoza, 1677).
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FINDING MORAL PRINCIPLES
The philosophies of Socrates and Plato are the
best known for giving moral guidance. The ideal
world described in these philosophies is promised
as being obtainable to anyone who is able to rise
above the trouble and strife of everyday life by
following reason and acquiring knowledge of the
good. While Socrates lived his philosophy to the
bitter end of his own death sentence, his example
is not easy to follow for lesser mortals. Aristotle’s
critique of Socrates’ teaching that virtue is all
and can overcome anything is powerful. It is a much
more realistic acknowledgement of the realities
of everyday life and the recognition that practical
wisdom consists not of being sufficient onto oneself,
but to be connected to the world and experience
all the emotions it evokes. Aristotle’s idea of moral
education is however an elitist one. 
The Epicureans by contrast seek to treat human
suffering by removing corrupting desires and by
eliminating pain and disturbance in the process.
Epicurean pupils are taught to adjust their values
in order to retain only those that are attainable and
may bring them pleasure. It is a method very much
like rational emotive therapy, which seems to promise
a life free of stress. Following this method one
relinquishes the unobtainable and adjusts one’s
expectations to what is realistic, so that with a
slight of hand we can obtain what we think we
want. This involves a detachment from one’s own
desires. The teaching of detachment is similar to
that in some forms of Buddhism, though for the
Epicureans detachment happens in relation to
externals, rather than in relation to self. The Epicurean
idea of the good life is unfortunately rather dogmatic.
Dialectical investigation and critical thinking
are replaced with formulae and communal living
enforces the creed. Some schools of psychotherapy
similarly stray into prescriptive territory. However
Epicures also understood something that neither
Plato nor Aristotle had fully grasped, i.e., that
false beliefs are often settled deep in the soul and
that they may not be available for argument. This
is something not all therapists are cognisant of,
although the psychoanalytic tradition promotes
the idea forcefully. 
Nussbaum indeed credits Epicures with the
discovery of the unconscious and shows how he
learnt to use the technique of narrative to contact
suppressed and hidden motivations and beliefs.
She makes this clear by drawing on Lucretius’
work with dreams and emotions and I found many
of his insights topical and useful. An example is
for instance his statement that 
‘to attend to the everyday and to make it
an object of delight or voluptas, intentional
and mutual, is to make a good marriage
possible’ (ibid., p. 185).
The aim of Lucretian therapy? It is ‘to make
the reader equal to the gods and at the same
time, to make him heed nature’s voice.’ In order
to do this we are taught how to deal with love,
death and anger, but most other topics get also
discussed in the process.   
The Epicurean view is that pleasure is the
only good and we are taught to adjust our needs
so as to guarantee the procurement of pleasure from
small natural resources. However according to
the Skeptics this in itself creates anxieties and
the only way to stop pain and suffering is to simply
not believe in or desire anything. So whilst Epicureans
try to get rid of false beliefs, the Skeptics want to
get rid of all belief. It is a strategy that is increasingly
popular in western society and that many people
today adopt in order to not get hurt. Nussbaum
herself notes that Skepticism is a knack that anyone
can learn and which sets out to protect one against
intensity. ‘But an intense attachment to the absence
of intensity is a funny sort of desire, a desire born
of troubles’ (ibid., p. 311), she comments incisively. 
Whilst Epicureans and Skeptics, unlike Plato
and Aristotle, reject reason as a way out of
difficulties, the Stoics accept it, but use it in a
rather forceful and controlling manner. Again the
parallels with contemporary psychotherapy are
fascinating. Who today could disagree with the
statement that ‘the job of living actively in
accordance with one’s own reason, rather than
passively, in the grip of habits and conventions,
requires vigilance and probing’ (ibid., p. 328).
On the other hand is our culture ready for the
kind of ordering of the self and soul that Stoics
propose to bring about? Perhaps it is more than
ready for the kind of exercise of the mind that
Stoics advocate, seeing the problems in living
that people contend with not as problems of evil
but rather as the result of a lack of moral fibre
and emotional weakness. Stoic therapy can begin
anywhere, because everything is connected, but
Stoics consider that different temperaments need
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different approaches and that there is a critical
moment (kairos) for intervention, a view shared
by the Epicureans. The Stoics make a point of
finding ways of penetrating deep into the soul
and use story telling to do so. 
The educational aspect of this therapy as of all
the other Hellenistic therapies is very strong, but
this particular one also emphasizes the aspect of
self-scrutiny, which includes an understanding of
one’s relationships. For the Stoics the pupil’s goal
is to become his own teacher and pupil: a goal
well beyond that of most forms of contemporary
psychotherapy, which leaves one to wonder
whether we have wandered rather far from the
philosophical path of intervention in to the
jungle of medical cure.
Stoics teach us that in order to improve a person’s
life the soul must be exercised everyday, for instance
by the use of logic and poetry. The objective is
wisdom, which is the only ultimate value and
virtue and leads to eudaimonia, the flourishing
life. We do not have to agree with the Stoical
conclusion that such wisdom is primarily achieved
through detachment and self-control. Nor need
we agree that it is necessary to extirpate our passions
as Stoics would like us to do. But we certainly can
learn a lot from some clear thinking about how
passions can best be tamed and benefited from.
Few psychotherapists have clear views on these
matters. If passions of which we lose control are
counterproductive then it is vital to be able to be
in charge of our own emotions. How can we enable
a person to expand their capacity for passion at
the same time as their ability to control it? We
need not get rid of passion altogether (as do the
Skeptics), or minimize it (as do the Epicureans)
or increase control over it (as do the Stoics). But
we do have to take these philosophical questions
seriously as our clients constantly struggle with
them. There are rich and fruitful interactions to
be had between philosophy and psychotherapy.
If we are to develop psychotherapy beyond its narrow
scope we need to reconnect with our philosophical
roots. 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY
It is somewhat surprising that philosophy and
psychotherapy do not have a more distinguished
history of co-operation. Both disciplines are concerned
with human well being and human living, the
one in a theoretical manner, the other in a much
more pragmatic way. One would expect psycho-
therapists to have noted the central importance of
philosophy to the practice of their own profession
and draw on philosophy as a source for understanding
their clients’ predicaments. Unfortunately this has
not been the case. Psychotherapists have on the
whole neglected the study of philosophy, which
they have frequently dismissed as irrelevant and
they have turned to medicine and psychology as
the disciplines of theoretical reference for their
domain.
Philosophy itself has to a large extent lost track
of its own mission to understand, clarify and sustain
the concrete realities of ordinary people and as it
spawned the sciences became increasingly abstract
and detached from its former objectives. This is
particularly evident in logical positivism. Nevertheless
there has always been a strand of philosophy that
concerned itself with human issues and there are
a number of philosophers, like Kant, Rousseau,
Spinoza, Hume and Hegel who have made important
contributions to the understanding of human nature.
They should be essential reading for trainee psycho-
therapists.  
It is however with the new impulse of the
philosophies of existence, particularly those of
Kierkegaard (1844, 1846, 1855) and Nietzsche (1881,
1882, 1886, 1887, 1888) that philosophers themselves
became directly interested again in the concrete
questions of human existence. The philosophies
of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche draw attention to
the subjective life of the individual and in this way
provide an excellent basis for the kind of philosophy
that can inform the practice of psychotherapy.
With the advent of Husserl’s phenomenology
(Husserl, 1900, 1913, 1925, 1929) a more concrete
methodology of investigation of human issues was
proposed enabling existentialism to come into its
own with the work of philosophers such as Heidegger
(1927, 1954, 1957), Sartre (1939, 1943, 1948)
and Merleau Ponty (1945, 1964, 1968). 
Existentialism became a popular movement as
people reclaimed philosophy as being of personal
relevance. Here at last was an approach that would
give them a handle on the moral choices, existential
crises and constant challenges of daily reality.
Philosophy was shown to be capable of providing
a forum for debate where light could be thrown
on the far-reaching changes that humanity had to
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negotiate in the modern and post-modern era. It
was therefore predictable that existentialism should
also generate a new form of psychotherapy in
which medical considerations were replaced with
wider human ones and where a person’s particular
problems were set off against the background of
a general existential perspective.   
EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY
Existential psychotherapy is the only established
form of psychotherapy that is directly based in
philosophy rather than in psychology. It was founded
at the beginning of the century, on the one hand
by the original work of Karl Jaspers in Germany,
(1951, 1963, 1964) which itself influenced Heidegger’s
thinking and on the other hand by the work of
two Swiss psychiatrists, Ludwig Binswanger (1946,
1963) and Medard Boss (1957, 1962, 1979, 1988),
who were in turn inspired by the work of Heidegger
to create an alternative method of dealing with
emotional and mental distress. All three turned
from psychiatry to philosophy, in an attempt to
understand the human predicament, paradoxes
and conflicts of their patients. These early applications
of existentialist philosophy to psychotherapy have
been followed by a number of other and varied
attempts, as for instance in the work of Frankl
(1946, 1955, 1967), May (1958, 1969, 1983), Laing
(1960, 1961, 1964, 1967), Szasz (1961, 1965, 1992)
Yalom (1980, 1989) and van Deurzen (1984, 1988,
1992, 1997, 1998, 2002). 
There has however continued to be great diversity
between these and other authors as no official or
formal rendering of existential psychotherapy has
ever been agreed. To confuse matters further existential
principles have also been applied more indirectly
to psychotherapy as part of the humanistic psychology
movement, for instance in Person-centred and
Gestalt approaches to psychotherapy, which often
pride themselves in their existential origins. Personal-
construct therapies also have a basis in the pheno-
menological approach and there are a number of
psychoanalytic writers who take existential ideas
into account as well. All of these approaches however
tend to focus on the intra-personal dimensions of
human existence and they have formulated psycho-
logical theories that do not allow the philosophical
dimension to come to the fore or to be central.
Radical existential psychotherapy focuses on the
inter-personal and supra-personal dimensions, as
it tries to capture and question people’s world-
views. Such existential work aims at clarifying
and understanding personal values and beliefs,
making explicit what was previously implicit and
unsaid. Its practice is primarily philosophical and
seeks to enable a person to live more deliberately,
more authentically and more purposefully, whilst
accepting the limitations and contradictions of
human existence. It has much in common with
the newly developed practice of philosophical
consultancy, which is just finding its feet in Germany,
the Netherlands, Israel and the United States (Lahav,
1995; Achenbach, 1984; Hoogendijk, 1991; Curnow,
2001; Herrestad, 2002).
There continues to be a lack of systematic
theorizing about existential psychotherapy and a
lack of research to demonstrate the effectiveness
of this kind of work. This is mostly because the
existential approach resists formalisation and opposes
the fabrication of a method that can be taught as
a technique and followed automatically. Existential
psychotherapy has to be reinvented and recreated
by every therapist and with every new client. It
is essentially about investigating human existence
and the particular preoccupations of one individual
and this has to be done without preconceptions
or set ways of proceeding. There has to be complete
openness to the individual situation and an attitude
of wonder that will allow the specific circumstances
and experiences to unfold in their own right. 
Unfortunately existential therapists like most
other therapists have their own dogmas and worldviews,
which constrict free philosophical exploration. I
do not believe that existential psychotherapy is
any better than any other form of therapy unless
it can detach itself from the desire to know and
prescribe. In order to truly make oneself available
to other human beings we need to learn to be in
doubt and wonder and dispense with wise words
other than those that come from one’s own expe-
rience. In this way it may become possible to
investigate with those who come to us for help
what meanings they want to attach to their own
lives and how they want to live these lives, given
their particular predicaments and their particular
personal and cultural assets. We have to accept
that there is no wisdom without doubt. 
As Paul Tillich once said:
The courage of confidence takes the anxiety
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of fate as well as the anxiety of guilt into
itself (Tillich, 1952, p. 163).
CONCLUSION
To go beyond psychotherapy is to see that a
dialectical process underlies the tensions of human
existence. Conflicts are constantly generated and
then overcome, only to be reasserted in a new
form. Life flows from a number of contradictory
forces working against and with each other. In
order to move successfully beyond psychotherapy
we have to recognize together with our clients
what specific tensions are at work in the client’s
life. This requires a process of careful scrutiny
and description of the client’s experience and a
gradually growing familiarity with the client’s
particular situation and stance in the world. To
understand the worldview and the states of mind
that this generates is to grapple with the way the
client makes meaning, which involves a coming
to know of clients’ values and beliefs. The particular
circumstances of the client’s life have to be recognized,
but so has the wider context within which this
life is lived. The philosophical helping process is
to elicit, clarify and put into perspective all the
current issues and contradictions that are problematic.
Part of the work consists in enabling the client to
come to terms with the inherent contradictions of
human living. Another part of it is to help clients
find a satisfactory direction for their future life
with a full recognition of the paradoxes that have
to be faced in the process. Ultimately the therapeutic
search is about allowing the client to reclaim
their own ability to be open to the world in all its
complexity. We need to research into what it
means to live a satisfactory, worthwhile and fulfilling
human life. A true philosophical exploration
will take account of what is true for the client
and set this against insights and understanding
gained from three thousand years of philosophy
and a century of psychotherapy. We are, with the
movement of therapeutic culture, at the beginning
of a new philosophical era. We are better equipped
than ever before to tackle life’s inevitable darkness
and adversity. Psychotherapists can learn to think
more clearly about the human issues they are
dealing with by drawing more directly on the
strengths of philosophy. The time has come to let
the side track of psychotherapy flow back into
the main stream of philosophy. The time has come
to join forces with philosophers and look beyond
this one century of psychotherapy towards a rich
past of human explorations. The time has come
to get out of the dark ages of an isolated psycho-
therapy profession, back into the light of a search
for wisdom.  
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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the relevance of philosophy to
psychotherapy. It traces the progression of early western
philosophy in its approach to human emotions and considers
how this is mirrored in current psychotherapeutic practice.
It argues that psychotherapists have much to learn from
philosophy and that a clear understanding of life events
and issues is essential for doing good psychotherapy.
Key words: Philosophy, psychotherapy, ethics, existential,
moral principles, emotions detachment, wisdom, dialectics,
well-being.
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RESUMO
Este artigo considera a relevância da filosofia para a
psicoterapia. Esboça o progresso da filosofia ocidental
antepassada na sua abordagem às emoções humanas e
considera como esta é espelhada na prática psicoterapêutica
actual. Argumenta que os psicoterapeutas têm muito que
aprender da filosofia e que uma clara compreensão dos
acontecimentos e assuntos da vida é essencial para praticar
uma boa psicoterapia.
Palavras-chave: Filosofia, psicoterapia, ética, existencial,
princípios morais, emoções, liberdade de espírito, sabe-
doria, dialéctica, bem-estar.
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